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SUGGESTED CHANGES IN NORTH CAROLINA
CIVIL PROCEDURE
ATWELL CAMPBELL MCINTOSH*
For fifty years after the adoption of the Code of Civil procedure
in North Carolina comparatively few changes were made in its pro-
visions, and it is better that this should have been so, since frequent
changes lead to more or less confusion and require time for read-
justment. Important changes were made in 1919, and at every
meeting of the General Assembly since that date amendments have
been made, with the general tendency to restore the provisions of
the original Code. There is no particular advantage in returning
to the first provisions, but the purpose of any change should be to
make the system of practice as simple and definite as possible, easily
workable, and requiring few appeals for judicial construction upon
mere questions of procedure. The different changes since 1919 have
been discussed in this Review,' as to their probable effect upon the
practice. A study of the more recent changes in 1927 suggests
several questions which will probably arise for construction and
which may be settled 'by slight amendments to make the meaning
more definite.
1. When is the summons in a civil action returnable?
Prior to 1927, the summons was made returnable on a certain
day named, and the defendant was required to answer within twenty
days after that date. The plaintiff knew the return day when the
summons was issued and he could readily keep up with his case,
while the defendants all had the same time to answer after this
return day and no judgment could be taken against them until the
expiration of that time. By the act of 1927,2 the defendant is
required to appear and answer within thirty days after service,
and if there are several defendants served at different times the
last day on which an answer might be filed would be different for
each one. It is also provided that the sheriff shall serve the summons
within ten days after the date of its issue, and if not served within
ten days he must return it to the clerk with the reasons noted for
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'1 N. C. LAw REv. 7, 279; 6 N. C. LAw REv. 182.
'Laws 1927, c. 66.
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failure to serve it. It is not provided, except by implication, when
the summons is to be returned if it is served, but the meaning would
seem to require that the summons contain an order to the sheriff to
return it within ten days, whether served or not. In the recent case
of Neely v. Minus,2 1 the question was discussed by Brogden, J.,
and the difficulty mentioned, but a definite decision was not neces-
sary. The plaintiff does not know when he may expect an answer
by the defendants, unless he is diligent to make inquiry of the sheriff
as to the date of service. In those states in which the summons is
issued by the plaintiff or his attorney, and generally served by an
agent, as a simple notice of action brought, this difficulty would not
exist; but where the summons is the process of the court, to be
served by an officer of the court, it would seem to be an advantage to
both parties to have a definite return day, from which the time to
answer could be counted and fixing definitely the time when the
plaintiff could demand a judgment for want of answer.
2. When is the defendant to answer in case of publication?
The same statute provides that where the service of summons
is made by publication, such service shall be completed "within fifty
days from the commencement of the action." While no definite
return day is named in the summons, the order and notice of publica-
tion require the defendant to appear and answer "at a time and
place therein mentioned," 4 "and the summons is deemed served at
the expiration of the time prescribed by the order of publication, and
the party is then in court." 5  When the publication is completed,
within the fifty days, the defendant is in court, but is he in court
for the purpose of judgment on the day named, or must the plaintiff
wait for thirty days after such service before he can proceed to
judgment? Whatever the practice may be in this respect, the statute
should definitely fix the rights of the parties.
3. When is a warrant of attachnient returnable?
The statute requires that the warrant of attachment shall state
when and where it is to be returned, and an amendment requires
that it shall be made returnable before the clerk at the same time and
place as the summons.0 If no publication is to be made, it would
196 N. C. 345, 145 S. E. -
Laws 1927, c. 66, 132.
'C. S. 485.
C. S. 487.3 C. S. 801.
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be returnable within ten days from the date of its issue; but in
most cases of attachment publication is necessary, and the order and
notice should fix a definite return day. The question is the same as
that presented in the summons.
4. What is the proper form of summons in a special proceeding?
The former section required the sheriff to summon the defendant
to appear before the clerk on a day named in the summons, to
answer the complaint, "and the number of days within which the
defendant is summoned to appear shall in no case be less than ten
exclusive of the day of service."7 This has always appeared to be
more or less confusing, and the difficulty has been met by making
the return day far enough off to allow service to be made and to
give the time required, or by extending the time to answer after
the return day so as to give the ten days after service. The amended
section provides that the summons shall require the defendant to
appear and answer on a day named in the summons, and "the return
date of the summons, the manner of service, whether by the sheriff
or by publication, shall be as prescribed for summons in civil action."8
Whether the defendant is required to answer on the date mentioned
in the summons, or within thirty days after service, is still not very
clear. The apparent intention of the amendment is to make the
summons in a special proceeding the same as in a civil action, and
there seems to be no good reason why it should be otherwise. In
each case the summons is returnable and the pleadings are to be
filed before the clerk, the only difference being in the jurisdiction
of the clerk to proceed with the hearing of the case and to render
judgment. The clerk is required to indicate on the summons that
it is issued in a special proceeding.9 The statute should be amended
so as to remove any uncertainty in the practice.
5. Who is responsible for issuing an alias or pluries summons?
It is made the duty of the plaintiff, under C. S. 480, to have
an alias or pluries summons issued when the original is returned
without service, and a failure to do this works a discontinuance
of the action.' 0 The recent amendment provides that if the sum-
mons is returned unserved, for want of time, "the clerk shall, within
" C. S. 753.
'Laws 1927, c. 66.
'Laws 1927, c. 66.
'0 C. S. 481.
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three days thereafter, issue an alias or pluries summons, as the case
may require."'" It is not clear whether the latter provision was in-
tended to repeal the former section and relieve the plaintiff of the duty
of looking after the alias or pluries summons, by requiring the clerk
to issue these as a matter of course, and if he should fail to do so,
whether it would have the effect of a discontinuance. In the case of
Neely v. Minus,"' the court decides that there was a discontinuance
under the circumstances of the case, but th6 question as to whether
the burden of issuing an alias or pluries summons is upon the clerk
or upon the plaintiff is said to be "a question for legislative and not
judicial determination." The evident purpose of the orignal sec-
tion was to make the plaintiff diligent in looking after his case,
with -the possible effect of losing his case entirely through the
statute of limitations, if his attorney should overlook the techni-
cality of having the chain of summons complete. 12  It would seem
to be a reasonable requirement in such cases to substitute the
duty of the clerk for that of the plaintiff or his attorney.
6. How many copies of the complaint must be served?
The present statute provides that the complaint is to be filed with
the clerk "at or before the issuance of the summons, and a copy
thereof delivered to the defendant, or defendants, at the time of the
service of the summons."' 3 Taken literally, this means that if there
are a dozen different defendants there must be a copy of the com-
plaint served upon each one, although they may 'be represented by
the same attorney and file one answer. The work of the plaintiff is
somewhat lighter if he gets an extension of time to file his complaint,
since he is then required to file "one copy for the use of the defen-
dant and his attorney," or if there are several defendants the clerk
may require him to file additional copies, not to exceed six. Unless
it is intended that there shall be a copy served upon each defendant,
(the statute says "delivered to the defendant, or defendants",)
in the first instance, the requirement should be more definitely stated.
Under the original Code it was optional with the plaintiff to serve
a copy of the complaint, but he was required to file with the clerk
a copy for each defendant, or one copy for those who appeared by
one attorney.'
4
'Laws 1927, c. 66.
"' 196 N. C. 345, 145 S. E.
" Hatch v. Alamance Ry. Co., 183 N. C. 617, 112 S. E. 529 (1922).
Laws 1927, c. 66.
"C. C. P. 76
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
7. When way an execution be issued on a judgnwnt?
As the law existed before the adoption of the Code, execution
could be issued within a year and a day, and if more than that time
had elapsed execution could not be issued without a notice to the
defendant to show cause.' 5 Under the Code, this was changed to
three years, and a judgment could be kept alive for purpose of
execution, by issuing execution every three years, or a dormant
judgment could be revived, after three years, by issuing a notice to
the defendant to show cause.1 6 This was repealed by the act of
1927, and it seems to be an open question whether a judgment ever
becomes dormant, and what would be the effect of the statute of
limitations upon the right to issue an execution. The present statute
allows the party to proceed 'by execution "at any time after the entry
of judgment,"' 7 except that no execution shall issue until the end
of the term at which the judgment was rendered.' 8 Under the
former law, if a judgment became dormant by failure to issue exe-
cution and it was also barred by the statute of limitations, no exe-
cution could issue without giving the defendant an opportunity to
take advantage of the bar of the statute.' 9 If execution may now
be issued "at any time", could the clerk refuse to issue it when it
appears that the judgment is barred? If it should be issued, the
defendant, when he learns of it, could make a motion to recall it,
but there is no provision for giving him notice. If the defendant
had no notice, or failed to make the motion to prevent a sale, would
the purchaser at such sale get.a good title? In view of the former
decisions, the logical result of the change would seem to be that no
execution could issue upon a judgment that is barred by the statute
of limitations. It would prevent uncertainty if the intended effect
of the repealing statute should be definitely stated.
These are some of the questions suggested by a study of the
recent statutes, and they may 'be finally settled -by judicial interpre-
tation, but this is sometimes an expensive and difficult method of
settlement. When any change is made in an established method
of procedure, it is an advantage to attorneys and litigants that the
effect of such changes should be indicated with reasonable certainty,
Rev. Code, c. 31, s. 114.
'C. S. 668.
IT C. S. 667, amended by 1927, c. 24.
"Laws 1927, c. 110.
"Lytle v. Lytle, 94 N. C. 683 (1886).
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so as to prevent expense and delay and to promote uniformity in
practice.
There are certain other questions of practice which have arisen
in other jurisdictions and which have been settled by statute as an
improvement over the former system, and in any material change in
our present practice some of these might be worthy of consideration.
8. The use of the demurrer as a pleading.
In some of the states, in the federal equity practice, and in the
English practice, the demurrer has been abolished as a pleading,
and the defendant is allowed to raise in his answer or by motion
the objections which were formerly taken by demurrer. 20 The
whole case is thus brought before the court at one time, and the
questions of law could be decided by the court as preliminary
matter or during the progress of the trial. There should be some
opportunity for a party to object to his opponent's pleading as a
matter of law, and this might be done as readily in the answer or by
motion as by a separate pleading. The most important objections, as to
the jurisdiction and a failure to state a cause of action, may now be
taken by answer or by motion at any time, and the other causes for
demurrer are more or less technical, to be remedied by an amendment.
If the causes for demurrer do not appear upon the face of the plead-
ing, objection is now taken by answer to be decided by the court, ex-
cept that the facts are not admitted, and there should be no greater
difficulty in reaching a decision when the facts are admitted. The
reasons for omitting the demurrer as a pleading are, that it simpli-
fies the pleading, prevents delay, brings the whole matter before the
court at once, and does not interfere with the rights of the parties.
The principal objection to the change is that it is a radical departure
from a long established rule, by which the demurrant is not required
to present his side of the controversy until the sufficiency of his
opponent's statement has been determined. As a matter of practice
its effect is to point out to the opponent the way to improve his
statement, except for the two substantive objections, and the rule of
adhering to a long established practice would have prevented the
change from the old common law and equity systems to the reformed
procedure under the Code.
"0Fed. Eq. Rules 29; ODGERs, PLEAD. AND PRAc., 175; CLARK, CODE PLEAD-
ING (1928) 371.
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9. Alternative pleading.
The plaintiff may set forth several different causes of action in
his complaint, or upon one cause of action he may ask for relief in
the alternative, but this is not the same as alternative pleading. The
plaintiff may know that one of two persons is liable, but not both,
and selects at his peril the one to be sued, unless he can make it a
joint liability. Some courts allow the plaintiff to state his cause
of action in the alternative, and he may recover according to the
effect of his proof, and the right of the plaintiffs to sue in the
alternative is also recognized. The old rules of pleading and the
present Code do not recognize alternative pleading as a proper state-
ment, but this has been changed in some of the states and in the
English practice.2 '
10. Declaratory Judgments.
In an existing controversy before the court, the rights of the
parties are declared and determined by the judgment rendered, be-
cause it is necessary to a settlement of their rights as presented, and
the case is one which calls for an immediate adjustment; or in the
case of an executor or trustee asking for advice, the court may
declare the rights and direct the proper course to be taken, but it
contemplates immediate action and not an inquiry as to what should
be done if certain circumstances should arise. This has been changed
in the English practice and in several states, so that the court may
settle disputes between the parties before there has been any actual
injury or loss.22 This is extending the principle of bills for advice
or suits to quiet title, and it has been considered an advantage in the
jurisdictions in which it has been adopted. As a recent develop-
ment in judicial procedure the following provision for a "Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act" has been prepared for adoption, as in
the Uniform Sales Act, Negotiable Instruments Law, and others:
"Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have
power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding
shall -be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judg-
ment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirma-
tive or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have
the force and effect of a final decree or judgment."
'23
=English practice, ODGERS, PLEAD. AND PRAC. 31; CLARK, CODE PLEADING
(1928) 273; 35 Yale L. J. 278; Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co.,
124 Minn. 117, 144 N. W. 450, 51 L. R. A. N. S. 640 (1913).
"FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS, p. 2780; 33 C. J. 1097; CLARK, CODE PLEADING
(1928) 230; 5 N. C. LAw REV. 228; ODGERS, PLEAD. AND PRAC., 399.
" Uniform Laws Annotated, vol. 9, p. 87.
